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The concept of 'Malaysia' was conceived as a strategy of the westem powers, n
Britain, to ensure that its former colonial possessions, namely (British) Malaya and
Bomeo (sarawak, Brunei, North Bomeo) did not switch or fall into the socialist/
camp. The genesis of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia which comprised
Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah (formerly North Bomeor), and that
realized on 16 September 1963 presented a bulwark to the advancement of the i
the communist ideology in the Southeast Asia region. The post-war situation and conditi
the then British colonial territories and protectorates of Malaya, Singapore, sarawak,
and North Borneo witnessed the increasing influence and threat of communism penn
the region. comparatively, however, Brunei and North Bomeo had scant Leftist impact.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the mandarins at whitehall, the Foreign office (Fo),
colonial office (co) were particularly anxious and apprehensive that their
possessions in Southeast Asia appeared to be susceptible and be swept by the Leftist
then prevailing in the region. Symptoms of this Leftist wave could be seen in neiehbouri
Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI, Indonesia communist partv). the phi
(Hukbalahap, Huk), and vietnam (Viet cong). within Malaya itself, there was the pro
Emergency (1948-1960) with the formidable Malayan communist party (MCp), whereas
singapore the Barisan sosialis (Socialist Front) was gaining strength and influence, and
in Sarawak, the clandestine manoeuvres of the Sarawak communist organization (
through the sarawak united People's Party (suPP) were worrisome, developments that
threatening and troublesome. Brunei, on its part, had to contend with the partai
Brunei (PRB, Brunei People's Parry) that had less than clear direction andlor ideoloei
orientation but apparently leaning towards Sukamo's Indonesia. Nevertheless, the bi
world brought forth by the Cold War during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s created
critical geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia analogous to the Malay saying, bagai telur
hujung tanduk,literally like an egg at the tip ofthe horn, a perilous situation.
It was apparent that Britain's interests, and that of its ally, the united states, in
Asia appeared to be amply threatened by the socialist/communist camp, not only
from Moscow but also Beijing, the latter seemed even more daunting. consequently,
inevitably, Malaysia was created to serve as a barrier to stamp the then increasing spread t
communism and thwart the Domino theorv.
' North Bomeo changed its name to sabah when it became a component part of the Federation of Malaysia in
1963.
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this essay shall argue that the formation of Malaysia was not only to ensure that
's colonial possessions of British Malaya2 and British Bomeo3 to not fall prey to the
ing Leftist wave then sweeping across post-war Southeast Asia, but also to ensure flrat
aforementioned strategic territories remained committed to the Westminster system of
ional monarchy in their post-independence existence. To this end, British officials
:worked hand in hand with local pro-Western leaders in accepting the wider federation
jooncept of 'Malaysia' and its realization, and that the newly created nation-state (Federation
,of Malaysia) shall remain grounded in the Western/'free world' camp in the post-war bipolar
world.
THE'BIG'PICTURE
The Cold War (1947-1990)
In brief, it was the divergent aspirations, needs, histories, governing institutions, and
ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union that turned unavoidable tensions
into the epic four-decade confrontation that we call the Cold War (McMahon 2003:
s).
Even before the dust had settled comfortably in the aftermath of the Second World War that
had brought untold misery, death, horrors to the greater part of the world, ideological
disparities reared its ugly head to cast asunder two colossal powers who were once wartime
allies, namely the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
(also Soviet Union, Soviet Russia). The ideological differences between them were far too
divergent for a wartime alliance to be sustainable in the post-war scenario. Whilst the U.S.
preached its brand of democracy and claimed to represent the so-called 'free world', the
USSR on the hand, insisted that the Soviet socialist model was the ideal for all nations, and
intended to 'export and impose' it on the world particularly the newly independent and
emerging nation-states (Gaddis 2006).
In facing off one another, both armed with nuclear amenal, the quality and quantity only
known to themselves, Washington and Moscow knew the risks and high stakes involved in an
ultimate showdown (Westad 2017). Hence, they played out their respective roles on a world
stage in a dramatic play titled the Cold War that ran between 1947 and 1991.
The synopsis of this Cold War play was basically described as a constant nonviolent state of
political hostility between the Soviet Union and the U.S. characterized by threats,
propaganda, and other covert measures short of open warfare (Fink 2017). Nonetheless, if it
'Britirh Muluyu comprised the Straits Settlements (1826) - crown colonies of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore,
the Federated Malay States (FMS, 1895) 
- 
protectorates ofPerak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, and
the Unfederated Malay States (UMS, 1909, 1914) 
- 
protectorates of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and
Johor.
3 When Britain granted protectorate status over Sarawak, Brunei, and North Bomeo in 1885, thus was created
'British Borneo' differentiating from Dutch Bomeo (presently Indonesia Kalimantan).
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fitted their respective agenda, both subscribed to proxy wars, that is they both
extemal.shife and/or conflictto attack the interests of the other. Washington took a
step in being involved as a direct combatant in Korea, and later in Vietnam, whilst
and Beijing, the third major player, lent support to North Korea and North Vietram,
The Korean War"(1950-1953) was the first proxy war between them. The United
(UN), with the U.S. as the principal force, lent military assistance to South Korea am
to slightly exceeding 300,000 ground troops (Kane 2013). China came to the aid of N
Korea with eround forces of some 1.3 million so-called "volunteers", and the Soviet
committed a force of 72,000 of which 5,000 were with the air force (Zhang 1995: 257;
1999).
When on I November 1955 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) deployed
Military Assistance Advisory Group to hain the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam), it marked the official beginning of American direct involvement in the war, thg'
Second Indochina War, and popularly, the Vietnam War. A decade later, U.S. ground
stepped on Vietnamese soil for the first time. A1 its peak in April 1969, there were 543,000
U.S. military personnel (Tucker 2011: xlv).
Besides Vietnam, elsewhere in Southeast Asia, both Washington and Moscow lent moral
to some extent material support to local struggles taking opposing sides. Beijing, much n
and much familiar to the region with historical ties stretching over several centuries,
moral support and material assistance to Leftist-leaning groups attempting to
themselves in the region.
The Leftist oWaYe'
The post-war decades of the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a Leftist wave rolling across
and Southeast Asia. On the Chinese mainland, the less than comfortable alliance (1937-1
between the Nationalist fuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
into an all-out civil war (1945-1949) following Imperial Japan's unconditional capitulation
August 1945. The Huaihai Campaign was the decisive military turning point in the
civil war (Westad 2003). The Battle of Hsu-peng (November 1948-January 1949)
more than 550,000 KMT troops were pinned down and encircled by the CCP's Peoplelr
Liberation Army (PLA) in Xuzhou marked the beginning of the end of Chiang Kai
(Jiang Jieshi). The defeat of the KMT led to CCP dominance of northern China.
Nanjing fell in April, Shanghai in May, and by October Mao at Tiananmen proclaimed
establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). By year's end, witnessed Chiang
the remnants of fhe KMT fleeing to Taiwan.
Meanwhile, tensions were escalating on the Korean Peninsula (Cumings 2010).
1910 and the end of the Asia Pacific War (1937-1945), Korea was under Imperial J
colonial ru1e. In connivance with Washington, Moscow in August 1945 declared war
Imperial Japan and proceeded to liberate Korea north of the 38th parallel. South of
i
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parallel saw the deployment of U.S. troops. Subsequently to avoid any untoward situation
especially of a rnilitary nature, the Soviet Union and the U.S. decided to split the peninsula at
the 38th parallel between them with iocal govemments suppofted by the two powers.
However, neither 'Koreas' accepted the existence of the other, instead both regimes claimed
to be the legitimate govefirment of Korea.
Then on 25 June, Pyongyang launched an invasion ofthe south (Appleman 1989). Two days
later, on 27 June, the tlN Security Council sanctioned the formation of UN forces to repel the
offensive of North Korea. With U.S. commitment of almost 90 per cent ground troops, a IJN
force comprising 21 nations was dispatched to the peninsula hence begun the three-year
conflict (25 June 1950- 27 July 1953). The Soviet Union and the PRC supported the
Pyongyang regime whilst the U.S. and other Western democracies were on the side of the
non-communist govemment of South Korea.
A pendulum-like conventional war was played out on the peninsula. By July 1953, it was
clear that neither side had the upper hand: a stalemate. An armistice was then proposed;
likewise, it also took on a pendulum-iike nature with an 'on-again, off-again' negotiation
series that stretched over two years (July 1953 
- 
November 1954) (Mount 2004). The
belligerents, viz. the IIN Command, the Nofth Korean People's Army, and the Chinese
People's Volunteers, penned the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953 thus ending the
fighting. While the 'hot' war may have ended, in the absence of a peace treaty, a'cold' war
ensued between Pyongyang and Seoul to the present (Jager 2013).
In the region that subsequently came to be known as 'Southeast Asia' owing to its war-time
designation of an area of military operation, the return of Western colonial powers to their
respective ter:ritories sparked armed conflicts with nationalist-led forces resisted the
reinstatement of the pre-war status quo. On the mainland, the series of conflicts referred as
the First and Second Indochina Wars were protracted wars that commenced almost from the
end of the Pacific War (1941-1945) until the f'all of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) in April 1975.
Less drawn-out was in insular Southeast Asia namely the Indonesian Revolution (.1945-
1949). Elsewhere, there were of pockets of Leftist-led insurgencies the Malayan Emergency
(1948-1960), and the Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946-1954).
Vietnamese-communist Viet Minh clashed with the French colonial forces in the First
Indochina War (1946-1954) (Waite 2012). The Viet Minh relied on support from both
Moscow and Beijing. The all-out armed conflict was played out in northwest Vietnam in and
around Hanoi. The French were finaily defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (May 1954).
The French reluctantly withdrew from Vietnam following the Geneva Agreernents (June
1954). The latter also dictated that Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, formerly comprising
French Indochina, became separate political entities. Pending elections to finally unify the
country, Vietnam was split into North and South at the 17th Parallel. The Norlh was under
the Viet Minh with Ho Chi Minh at the helm whilst the U.S.-backed Nso Dinh Diem
administered the South. The elections. however. were never held.
374
ry
clouded with conkoversy and conspiracy speculation, the so-called Gulf of Tonkin
on 2'.August 1964 sparked an intemational confrontation between the u.S. and
vietnam. Apparently, the usS Maddox, a destroyer was not only pursued by
vietnamese torpedo boats but was attacked with torpedoes and machine gun fires.
was the truth of this engagement, this naval incident marked the beginning of u.S.
military involvr*nent in the second Indochina war or more commonly and popularly
to as the vietnam war (Kamow L997;Freedman2016). Between 1964 and,the fall of
on 30 April 1975, the commrurist vietnam people's Army (vpA, or people,s
vietnam, PAVN) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) (namely South vietnamese
guerrilla fighters allied with the PAMrl, collectively and derogatorily referred to as
cong, literally 'communists Traitors to vietnam') on the one side against the u.s.
U.S.-backed Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AR'/N) on the other. The
Republic of vietnam, the offtcial designation of North vietnam was supported
financially, and militarily by Beijing and Moscow, and also their communist allies in
Communist bloc.
The vietnam war overflowed and juxtaposed with the Laotian civil war (1g62-lgi-5)
the cambodian civil war (1967-1975) (Issacs et al. l9g7). The conflict scenario
identical to the vietnam situation, namely a communist side clashine with a non
opponent. In neighbouring cambodia, the armed struggle was between the communist
Rouge and its PAVN allies against the U.S.-supported govemment (Kingdom of
1967-1970; Khmer Republic, 1970-1975) (Kubota 2013). The situation in Laos witnessed
U.s.-backed Kingdom of Laos defending itself from the communist pathet Lao with
from the PAVN (conboy 1995). Behind the communist side in both conflicts was the
lent by Beijing and Moscow.
Across the South china sea, a protracted uprising known as the Hukbalahap Rebellion (l
1954) that was initially staged against the occupying Imperial Japanese Army (uA) dr
the Pacific war (1941-1945) continued in the post-war period against the i
Philippine govemment at Manila. whilst the conflicts in Indochina were communi
national liberation wari, the Hukbalahap Rebellion appeared to be struggles by
against apparent socio-economic injustices and mistreatment. It was largely a conse(
the collapse of the traditional padrino relationship (landlord-tenant), the Huk
represented an economically maladjusted peasantry's response to change. The
government labelled the Huks as communist owing to its alliance with the
Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM, National Peasants Union) that later transformed into
communist Party of the Philippines (cpp). Initially guerrilla fighters of the Hukbo ng B
Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese People's Army) fought against the uA, then the U.S.
colonial Philippine constabulary, and thereafter folrowing independence, the i
Philippine government. It was alleged that the Huks received support from the soviet(Gojo 1984).
Meanwhile, the returning colonial Dutch forces that landed in post-war Netherlands
Indies following Imperial Japan's surrender faced a skong Indonesian nationalist mov
rTriumphant over the Dutch in the hrdonesian Revolution (1945-1949) not only offered
invaluable military experiences for the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National
Armed Forces) but also it ensured post-war leaders such as Sukarno, president of the
ftepublic were somewhat beholden to the generals. The 1950s to the mid-1960s saw the
struggle between the TNI and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist
Party) jostling for favour, power and influence with President Sukarno. Sukamo, the
consummate Javanese dalang (puppeteer) sought to balance the two formidable national
forces, undoubtedly a challenging and dangerous act. The PKI became increasingly
demanding to the extent of intending to form a people's militia that could directly threatened
the TNl.
TTIE 'SMALL' PICTURE
Against the aforesaid backdrop across East and Southeast Asia, the concept and subsequently
the reality of the creation of Malaysia was realized in 1963. Turning to the 'small'picture of
the environments of what was then Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Bomeo,
the foregoing section will consider the Leftist wave from within.
The View from Within
Almost similar to the Philippines Hukbalahap Rebeilion, the genesis of the Malayan
Emergency (1948-1960) dates back to the military occupation of Malaya by the IJA during
the Pacific War (1941-1945). The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) that was
initiated and dominated by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) posed at best an irritant to
the IJA. The British who were the colonial master of pre-war Malaya airdropped supplies
including arms and ammunition to the MPAJA; the MCP hid most of these weapons and
military supplies deep in the jungle (Chen 1995). Post-war developments saw the retuming
British colonial authorities moving against Leftist elements.
Then in mid-1948, a 'reign of terror' begun with the MCP killing several European rubber
planters that sparked the declaration of the so-called Malayan Emergency.o From here, the
MCP differentiated from the Huks in that MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng and his jungle
guerrillas intended to overlhrow the government of the day (British colonial regime, and
thereafter, from 1957 the govemment of independent Malaya) replacing it with a communist
republic of Malaya (Tonder 2017). Whilst the MCP waged a jungle guerrilla war in the rural
regions of Malaya, Leflist elements in urban Singapore sought the ovefthrow of the colonial
government through industrial action of labour strikes, sabotage, riots, and acts of social
unrest. Meanwhile the MCP launched economic subterfuge in slashing rubber trees and
destroying equipment and machinery in tin mines to create economic dislocation and social
disorder. Following the outbreak of chaos and turmoil, the MCP in Malaya and Leftist
elements within the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) in Singapore would seize the
4 Although it was an all-out war situation, the term 'emergency' was used for purposes of insurance claims
particularly essential in the mining and plantation sectors.
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opportunify for attaining political power. Both parties to the struggle and armed
Malaya.and Singapore attempted to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the common
(Stubbs 1990).
contemporaneous to happenings in Malaya and singapore, the communists in
attempted to inflltrate labour unions, peasant organizations, and bona fide political
Infiltration in the former two failed but succeeded in the Sarawak united people's
(suPP). The communist 'united front' strategy worked in SUpp almost dominating
political party short of the presidency and secretary-general's post that were
moderates. The chinese-dominated Sarawak communist organization (sco) adopted
strategy of pushing for independence from the British government and thereafter sei
political control in post-independence elections (ooi 2012). The Sarawak Chinese vi
indigenes were far better off economically, educafionally, and in political consciousness. j
Not only were there merely small communities of chinese in neiehbourine North
they too were less politically active as their brethren in Sarawak. Leftist activists too
less successful in gamering recruits and/or support from both chinese or natives in
Borneo. North Bomeo, therefore, in the post-war decades of 1950s and 1960s was a politi
backwater vis-d-vis its immediate vicinitv.
The Malay Muslim sultanate of Brunei had for centuries being ruled by absolute
weaknesses from within in the second half of the 19tr century saw the sultanate
territories to neighbouring Sarawak then under the white Brooke Raiahs and North
administered by the British North Borneo chartered company (BNBCC). In order
safeguard the political integrity of Brunei, the British govemment in 1gg5
protectorate status over Brunei, Sarawak, and North Borneo that subsequently referred to
Bdtish Borneo. Brunei maintained its status quo as a British protectorate in the post-
period. But there were quaders from within the sultanate that wanted to reform the
monarchy whereby seeking a devolution of political power from the istana (palace)
2012). The founder-president of Partai Rakyat Brunei @RB, Brunei people,s party) A.
Azahai vacillated between, on the one hand, the restoration of the sultanate to its i
heyday of the 14ft /15ft century where its influence and power engulfed the entire island
Borneo, and on the other hand, the more modest and realistic ambition of setting up
Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan utara (unitary state North Borneo) that comprised
Sarawak and North lorneo with the sultan as head of state and himself as prime mini
(Ooi 2012).
.MALAYSIA'
Against the background of developments between the late 1940s to the early 1960s where
Leftist wave was sweeping across East and Southeast Asia, British concerns of
possessions in the later region, viz. British Malaya and British Bomeo appear vulnerable
succumbing and/or being drowned in the wave. on the one hand, from London's
decolonization appeared inevitable in the post-war situation. The question or challenge
377
was how to severe colonial relations without plunging the newly-independent state into chaos
or a bloodbath between contentious political groups or ethnic communities, or being
consumed by the then prevailing Leftist wave. The situation was both delicate and urgent;
.delicate' in the context of a multiracial territory like Malaya where the economically
dominant group were non-native Chinese whilst the indigenous Malays were retarded
economically and educationally. The Indian minority, a colonial creation out of necessity for
labour, was of concem as the majority were equally as backward as the Malays. The reins of
political power and leadership need to be handed to those who would not utilize power and
position to dominate and exploit others, particularly minorities and disadvantaged groups.
The urgency was in the face of the increasing strength of the Leftist wave on the one hand,
and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's 'Wind of Change' speech in 1960 that
officially marked the implementation of the decolonization policy, a letting-go of imperial
responsibility, on the other hand.
From the British colonial viewpoint, Tunlr-u Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, a Malay prince
frorn the norlhem Malay state of Kedah appeared to be the trustworthy candidate to hand
over the baton. A Cambridge-trained lawyer, Tunku was an Anglophile and staunchly anti-
communist (Abdullah Ahmad 2016). The informal poiitical cooperation between Tunku's
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
in local govemment elections of 1955 proved a successfui coup in demonstrating a viable
Sino-Malay political partnership. Later the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) joined the
UMNO-MCA pact subsequently evolving into the Alliance Party. It was to Tunku as chief
minister (internal self-rule), later prime minister (independence), and the Alliance Party that
the British handed over the reins of political independence of Malaya in August 1957.
Independent Malaya joined the British Commonwealth demonstrating the goodwill and close
affinity between Kuala Lumpur and London.
Having successfully negotiated with the British govemment for the independence of the
Federation of Malaya in 7951 , Prime Minister Tunku announced the concept of a wider
federation known as 'Malaysia'. In May 1961 Tunku publicly proposed to create a wider
federation that would comprise independent Malaya, the British crown colonies of Singapore,,
Sarawak and North Bomeo, and the protectofate of Brunei' This Malaysia concept
proverbially appeared to 'kill two birds with a single stone': first1y, the decolonization of
Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, and Nofth Borneo, and secondly, ensuring that the aforesaid
territories including Malaya remained within the British orbit of influence. Moreover, this
proposed wider federation could pose as a bulwark to the Leftist wave with anti-communist
Tunku at the helm. 'Malaysia' then seemed to be the 'ideal' solution in the event when
Britain withdrew from the region.
But in convincing the leaders of the various teritories to buy into the 'Malaysia' concept
seemed rather chalienging (Ghazali Shafre 2015). Chief Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his
People's Action Palty (PAP) then governing self-rule Singapore was supportive of
'Malaysia'. Brunei's Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III was initially keen on the concept, but
kept reservations over the monarchy issue and financial matters. Oil-rich Blunei was
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apprehensive ifa satisfactorily financial arrangement not adversely disadvantageous
attained with'the other parhers particularly the Tunku and Malaya (Vienne 2015)' L
Sarawak and North Bomeo were hesitant towards 'Malaysia' as many were political
subsequently Malayan and singapore leaders were able to convince their
connterparts that 'Malaysi a' was the passport to unshackling the colonial yolk.
On their part, British officialdom 'on the spot' worked hard for the realization of 'Mala
Directly involved were Lord Selkirk, British Commissioner-General for Southeast
(1959-1963) and his predecessor Malcolm MacDonald (1948-1955), Sir william Goode
Sir Alexander Waddell colonial governors of North Borneo and Sarawak respectively, an
C. White, the British high commissioner to Brunei.
However, anti-Malaysia elements attempted to derail the formation of this wider
In Sarawak, the SCO that had infiltrated SUPP convinced the latter to oppose 'Malaysia' as
was thought, rather correctly, that joining this new extended federation would make it
to seize power as the Malay-dominated federal government in Kuala Lumpur would
formidable opponent to any Leftist political action (Ooi 2012). SUPP was the only po
parfy in the Bomean territories that was not in favour of Tunku's wider federation.
SUPP campaigned for Sarawak's independence from Britain. Donald Stephens, .
president of the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) of North Bomeo initia
allied with SUPP and PRB leaders in opposing 'Malaysia'. Stephens later relented' :
Azahrr;iand the PRB objected to 'Malaysia' in favour of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan
where Brunei would take the lead in this northern Bomeo nation-state' Indonesia's
saw throush the British ruse in the formation of 'Malaysia' that would continue as a
neo-colony (Poulgrain 2014). Britain's influence and power in the region would be
throush this new federation. A war of words erupted befween Kuala Lumpur and J
Sukamo acaused Tunku of being a British puppet, and in turn, Tunku labeled s
puppet of Beijing. It appeared that Sukarno's opposition was prompted by PKI that
British-supported 'Malaysia'. as a bulwark to the spread of the communist wave across
region. PKI had CCP support, hence Tunku's likening of the Indonesian strongman
Chinese puppet.
President Diosdado P. Macapagal's opposition was his contention that North Bomeo
territorial possession of the Philippines. In the late 19th century when North Borneo
under the administration of BNBCC, the latter acquired rights from both the Brunei and
sultanates. Since the Sulu sultanate was part of the independent Republic of the Phili
Manila laid claim to North Bomeo (sabah, from 1963). This 'Sabah claim' strained
between Kuala Lumpur and Manila over several decades (Amer 2004)'
THE SO-CALLED BRUNET REBELLTON (1962)
In December
North Coast
1962, nationalists in Brunei, the hugely wealthy small kingdom on
of Borneo, formed the Army of North Kalimantan (TNKU)
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demandinggteatetdemocracy,engineeredarebellionagainstthesultanandseizeda
largenumberoft,ostages.p".ceiueatobeanattemptbycommuniststodestabilisethe
Sultanate una ,"2" f"o*er, within twelve hours of its outbreak, 
British forces were
despatchedbyshipandaircraftfromsingaporetorestoreorder,thefirstunittoarrive
beingli2ndGurkhas,whoenteredthecapital.Withintheweek,thelQueensown
Highlanderst'uo,""-upt,,..dthestrategicallyimportantoilfieldsarrdoccupiedSeria,
42 Command", o"V"iVf"tines attacked Limbang and 1 Green 
Jackets landed in west
Brunei. The next six months were spent rounding 
up TNKU and, since there were
majorconcemsthatlndonesiacouldbebehindtheRevolt,thecharismaticMajor
GeneralWalterWalker,thencommandingl7thGurkhaDivision,wassenttoBrunei
tocommandoperations'Bymid-May1963'thesurvivingTNKUhadbeencaptured'
Whilerapidly,"on,",."a'*eRevoltwasthecatalystforthethree-yearConfrontation
with Indonesi a 1963 -66 (Bijl 20 12: blurp)'
Havingsuccessfullywonlocalgovemmentelections,thePRBbecameimpatientwiththe
palacethatseeminglyhesitatedtoconvenetheLegislativeCouncil.Azahuihadpreparedtwo
plans:comingtopowerthroughconstitutionalmeansthroughdominationoftheLegislative
Council,andanaltemativeroute,namelyarmedseizureofpower.Whilsttheformerwas
beingpursued,thelatterwasclandestinelyorganizedwithmilitary-styleuniformsandarms.
when pRB demands were tumed down by the sultanate's 
govemment, plans were underway
for an armed insurrection scheduled for 24 Decemb er 
196i. But the chance arrest of several
individualswithacacheofmilitaryuniformsandsomeweaponry'thedateforanarmed
seizureofpowerhadtobepushedfo,wu.dlestthedetaineesexposedthePRBplansinthe
course of interrogation'
Hence, on 8 Decemb w |962,members of PRB's military arm' Tentera Nasional 
Kalimantan
Utara(YNKU,NationalArmyofNorthKalimantan)launchedconcertedattacksonpolice
stations throughout the sultanate. 
,.perceived to be an attempt by communisrs to destabilise
the Sultanate and seize power,,, sultan omar invoked British 
military assistance as laid out in
theAnglo-BruneiAgteements.BritishGurhkabattalionswereairliftedfromSingapore.In
less than a week, the swift military action of British forces suppressed 
the uprising; hundreds
weredetained.Azahariwasinthephilippinesduringtheoutbreakofhostilities;thereafterhe
fled to Indonesia.
SultanomarmighthavebeeninfluencedbyhisadvisorsthatthePRBwasleaningtowards
theLeft.TheslantofAzahari,sPRBtowardsSukarno'slndonesiaasindicatedintheusage
ofpartaiinsteadotpartiwasclearindictmentofpartialitytothesouthernneighbourthatwas
thenexperiencingtheincreasinglyinfluence*dpo*",ofthePKl.LiketheMalayanTunk-u'
Sultan Omar was anathema to socialism andior communism'
Thisso-calledBruneiRebellionsparkedawitch-huntinneighbouringSarawakinparticular,
and to a lesser extent in North Borneo, where Leftist elements 
were detained, imprisoned, or
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deported. SUPP's membership was literally denuded; non-Chinese members and
deserted flip party when it was reblized the great extent of Leftist infiltration.
The Less than 'Happy Family'
Owing to the crabkdown, hundreds of SCO members, mainly young Chinese men
women, PRB members and TNKU officers and militias fled across the border to
Kalimantan. They were welcomed by PKI activists. The Sarawak and Brunei refugees
orgaaized into military units and underwent military training by TNI instructors with
intention that they (refugees) would cross back to fight the Sarawak and Brunei gov
A host of anti-Malaysia elements - SCO members, PRB members and TNKU officers
militias, PKI cadres, and TNI military units - on the Kalimantan borderlands with
had an uneasy cohabitated (Ooi 2012). Despite acting as military instructors to the
communist Chinese youths, TNI offrcers were ever weary of Leftists elements, parti
PKI cadres. Meanwhile, both PKI and TNI in their respective reckoning were uncertain
PRB and TNKU militias of what their intentions, aims, ambitions. Apparently, the Brunei
themselves were unclear about the so-called rebellion; many thought that they were
on behalf of the sultan, therefore were disillusioned when the latter called upon the British
assistance. Consequently, relations among the various groups were at best civil and
all quarters were less than trustful of one another. Hence, this less than 'Happy Family'
their best to survive the harsh conditions of the thick tropical jungle enveloping
Kalimantan- Sarawak borderlands.
Once preparation and re-organization of its military units were accomplished, SCO
crossed back to Sarawak to launch assaults against the colonial administration targeting
police stations where much needed arms and ammunition could be seized. The year 1
marked the commencement of the Sarawak Communist Insurgency, a protracted all
military campaign of the SCO in attempts to topple initially the colonial regime and th
when Sarawak became a pArt of Malaysia (from 1963), the Malaysian government
2004; Tat 2008). Alongside a mainly jungle war of attrition, there was the psychol
struggle on either side to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the populace. A tit-for-tat as
as a hide-and-seek affair was a drawn out struggle that dragged over nearly three
with significant casualties on either side including civilians caught in the cross-fires.
PERSPE CTIVE'F'ROM WIIITEHALL
Meanwhile in the conidors of Whitehall" CO mandarins and FO offrcials were
ways and means to attain the smooth decolonization prooess of the last remaining three
colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, and North Bomeo. The Malaysia plan was an i
shategy that not only severed the colonial strings from the three territories but also
that all the three remained non-communist. The staunchly anti-communist Tunku was,
ideal prime minister for independent Malaysia. Faith in the Tunku was high as his Mala
govemment with assistance from British and Commonwealth military forces had
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defeated a communist insurgency (1948-1960); in fact, the colonial, and later independent
Malayan government, was the first to overcome a communist armed insumection (Thompson
1966). The new nation-state of Malaysia, from London's viewpoint, was comfortably safe in
the hands ofthe Tunku.
Sukamo's declaration of 'Konfrontasi' in opposition to the formation of Malaysia was met
with increased allocation of military resources including ground troops frorn Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth countries that lent assistance to Malaysian
security forces in countering TNI military incursions along the Kalimantan-Sarawak border.
At the same time, Malaysian military forces were engaging with SCO guerrillas in Sarawak's
forested interior as well as the Rejang delta areas, a'hotbed' of SCO activities of recruitment,
propaganda and garnering suppofi from the largely Chinese inhabitants.
TTIE 'HIDDEN' HAND
Questions emerged of the 'hidden' hand behind the circumstances leading to the
pronouncement of the wider federation of Malaysia in 1961 and developments thereafter,
namely the Brunei Rebellion (1962), Konfrontasi (1962-1966), the formation of Malaysia
(1963), the Sabah claim (since 1962), and the Gestapu Affair (1965). On hindsight, the
decades of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were the defining years of the Cold War in Southeast
Asia. The main Cold War actors notably the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the PRC might
each have played a part in initiating developments, either directly or through 'puppets' and
'agents' to further their interests and agenda in this pivotal comer of the world. The then
subscription to the 'Domino Theory' that foresaw that the fall of the Indochina states
(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) would unleashed a domino effect witnessing the chain
reaction of the collapse of the Thai monarchy and govemment, then military-ruled Burma,
independent Malaya/Malaysia, the Philippines republic, and the unitary state of Indonesia, all
falling into the hands ofLeftist groups in the respective territories.
First and foremost, was the concept of 'Malaysia' Tunku's brainchild, or was the idea of a
wider federation imposed on him by the CO and FO mandarins? The creation of Malaysia
was, as mentioned, a decolonizing scheme by Whitehall to ensure that Singapore, Sarawak,
and North Borneo were granted independence under the fold of a staunchly anti-communist
leader, namely the Tunku of Malaya. With or without the Tunku, London was determined to
discharge its Bomean territories (Sarawak and North Bomeo) as well as its naval base at
Singapore. Within a short period, Britain announced in 1966 its 'East of Suez' withdrawal of
military commitments in line with MacMillan's 'Wind of Change' speech.
Therefore, from Whitehall's perspective, Malaysia was an inevitable creation. The Tunku
was an ideal leader to hand over the reins of power of this wider federation whom Whitehall
trusted in keeping the faith (pro-British) politically as well as economically. A11 the ter:ritories
that comprised Malaysia 
- 
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (formerly North Borneo)
- 
possessed substantial British capital and investments. Whitehall was convinced that the
Tunku would not perform an ala-Sukarno in nationalizing all foreign (mainly British) assets
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in post-independent Malaysia. Rightly read by whitehall, the Tunku did not desert
for Malaysia, as in the case,of Malaya (1957) previously, immediately joined the
commonwealth shortly after its formation n 1963. whitehall prevailed; none of its
colonial possessions in their post-independent existence switched to the socialisV
camp.
.a.'
But from Tunku's perspective, it appeared that 'Malaysia' was a 'touch and go' case
himself having to work hard towards its realization.
Tunku himself vividly reminisces unhappy encounters among the three main
President sukamo, President Macapagal and runku himself 
- 
and the bitter
frustrating experiences he had to ensure in his struggle to make Malaysia a nati
Tunku, for example, reveals the almost impossible task of achieving any kind
pemanent concessions on the merger from either the Indonesian or Filipino leadr
the fence ofthe new Federation against the confrontation with Indonesia; or deal
with domestic opposition to the merger (Kobkua 2017 lg7).s
Lee Kuan Yew of singapore, Datu Bandar Abang Hj Mustapha, Stephen Kalong Ni
and remenggung Jugah anak Barieng of Sarawak, Donald (Fuad) stephens and run
Haji Mustapha bin Datu Harun of North Bomeo (sabah) were, like the Tunku of
pro-British and anti-communist. Stephens, as earlier mentioned, opposed .Malaysia',
a suprising tumaround to led his support. If it was to be believed an ,open secret' in
revealed that singapore's Lee, prompted by the Tunku, baited stephens with a .
premiership that apparently got the latter onboard the Malaysia bandwagon.6
only leaders of the SUPP, namely Founding-president ong Kee Hui and Founding
General stephen Yong Kuet Tze, owing to party grassroots' opinion that was
influenced and infiltrated by Leftist elements, steadfastly opposed Malaysia when it was
mooted in 196l and held to its anti-Malaysia stance for at least a decade. A wi
following the Brunei Rebellion (1962) and, operation Hammer (1965) where hundreds
resettled ensured that Leftist elements amongst the Chinese communities in Sarawak r
within the sUPP shucture were flushed out 
- 
detained, imprisoned, or deported.
were wen Ming chyuan, Yang chu chung, Bong Kee chok, and others of the SCo
pawns of Beijing or were they acting unilaterally on their own pace? The former was
probability as can be seen in the action and activities of wen, head of Sarawak
Guerrilla Force (sPGF, Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, PGRS) in sarawak's
Division, and founding-chairman of the North Kalimantan communist parfy (NKCp, I
wen had given up his sarawak citizenship in 1962, and requested that he be
china. Between 1962 and the formation of NKCp, wen clandestinelv travelled
china, Sarawak, and Kalimantan. Following the formation of NKCp, wen wenr ro
s The.'domestic opposition' refers to the detractors such as Abdul Aziz and his National Convention party
fl9,nl,h"l camPargnin the General Elections 1964, and Dr Lim Chong Eu's United Democratic p*ty GlfSee Femandez (2011).
he remained for the next two decades. Wen's residence in Beijing and his previous
ing between the mainland, Sarawak and Kalimantan undoubtedly had the support of
the CCP and the PKI that facilitated and support his activities. It could be surmised that
en could likely qualifu as Beijing's 'man-on-the-spot' in Sarawak throughout the second
of the 1960s in directing the armed struggle until his departure for the mainland n 1910.
i.
It was unclear where Azahari stood on the Cold War divide. Although unlikely to be on the
Soviet/PRC camp, he was partial to strongman Sukarno having participated alongside
Republicans against the Dutch and British during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949).
Altematively, Azahai could staunchly be a Brunei patriot in wanting to revive the sultanate's
past glory in his proposed Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara. But Sultan Omar preferred the
British umbrella with Gurkhas as security.
Did Sukarno's anti-Malaysia stance be construed as a diversion to appease the TNI? A
foreign war would undoubtedly please the generals with expanded budgets for military
resources to support Konfrontasi. TNI had to be appeased in the face of the emergenae of PKI
as a force to be reckoned.
Confrontation served important domestic interests in Indonesia. Sukamo could
distract attention from political tension and deteriorating economy by focusing on an
external enemy. Military action justified greater resouraes for the armed forces, and
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) could use the campaign to help radicalize the
masses (Cribb 2004: 7 4l).
Meanwhile, Sukarno, the consummate Javanese dalang sought a balancing act between the
TNI and the PKI, even attempting to play off one against the other. [n the end, the dalanglost
all his tricks; the generals acted with the Gestapu Affair, that not only ended Konfrontasi but
also signalled the start of a Leftist bloodbath that consumed the lives of thousands. Sukamo
himself was held under house arrest until his passing in 1970.
Macapagal's opposition to Malaysia over the Sabah claim was on his own volition spurred by
a patriotic notion of the territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. It was unlikely that
Manila's erstwhile ally, the U.S. had any 'hidden hand' in Macapagal's territorial claim.
In 1950, Congressman Macapagal, along with Congressmen Arsenio Lacson and
Arturo Tolentino, sponsored a resolution urging the formal institution of the claim to
North Borneo. Prolonged studies were in the meanwhile undertaken, and in 1962 the
House of Representatives, in rare unanimity, passed a resolution urging the President
of the Philippines to recover North Borneo consistent with intemational law and
procedure. Acting on this unanimous resolution and having acquired all the rights and
interests of the Sultanate of Sulu, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
President [Macapagal], filed the claim to North Bomeo (Soliven 2013).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper sets out to demonstrate that the creation of Malaysia was intended to ensurrBritish Malaya and British Bomeo were not swept up by the prevailing Leftist wave
rolling across post-war Southeast Asia. At the same time, post-independent
remained in the westem/'free world' camp and practiced a system of cor
monarchy. Its immediate membership of the British commonwealth further
Malaysia's commitment to the westem/'free world' side of the cord war divide.
Against the context of the regional situation of the 1950s and 1960s where Leftist
was increasingly expanding, Malaysia,s creation in 1963 was inevitable. The
concept attained Britain's two objectives, viz. firstly a smooth decolonization of its
crown colonies (Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo), and secondly, the newly
nation state did not fail prey to the socialisvcommunist camp. In a singre stroke,played its cards according to its strategic interests. ln walking away (,East of Suez,),
was contented that Malaysia was in good hands (Tunku,s).
-----oo0oo-----
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